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Washington, DCA B S T R A C TObjectives: To examine whether patients with newly diagnosed
cancer respond differently to supplemental coverage than the general
Medicare population. Methods: A cohort of newly diagnosed cancer
patients (n ¼ 1,799) from the 1997-2007 Medicare Current Beneﬁciary
Survey and a noncancer cohort (n ¼ 9,726) were identiﬁed and
matched by panel year. Two-year total medical care spending was
estimated by using generalized linear models with gamma distribu-
tion and log link—including endogeneity-corrected models. Interac-
tions between cancer and type of insurance allowed testing for
differential effects of a cancer diagnosis. Results: The cancer cohort
spent an adjusted $15,605 more over 2 years than did the noncancer
comparison group. Relative to those without supplemental coverage,
beneﬁciaries with employer-sponsored insurance, other private with
prescription drug coverage, and public coverage had signiﬁcantly
higher total spending ($3,510, $2,823, and $4,065, respectively, for
main models). For beneﬁciaries with cancer, supplemental insurancesee front matter Copyright & 2014, International S
r Inc.
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Avenue, Burlington, VT 05405.effects were similar in magnitude yet negative, suggesting little net
effect of supplemental insurance for cancer patients. The
endogeneity-corrected models produced implausibly large main
effects of supplemental insurance, but the Cancer  Insurance
interactions were similar in both models. Conclusions: Medicare
beneﬁciaries with cancer are less responsive to the presence and type
of supplemental insurance than are beneﬁciaries without cancer.
Proposed restrictions on the availability of supplemental insurance
intended to reduce Medicare spending would be unlikely to limit
expenditures by beneﬁciaries with cancer, but would shift the ﬁnan-
cial burden to those beneﬁciaries. Policymakers should consider
welfare effects associated with coverage restrictions.
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The availability of supplemental insurance has been identiﬁed as
one cause of increased health care spending by Medicare beneﬁ-
ciaries. Basic Medicare coverage includes various cost-sharing
mechanisms designed, in part, to restrain spending. Supplemental
Medicare coverage, however, lowers—and in some cases elimi-
nates—cost sharing at the point of consumption and thus dra-
matically reduces the effectiveness of these mechanisms [1,2].
Most Medicare beneﬁciaries have some type of supplemental
coverage. According to 2008 estimates, 51% of the Medicare
beneﬁciary population had some sort of private medical insurance,
15% had Medicaid, and 24% were enrolled in Medicare Advantageplans [3]. Concern about the effects of supplemental insurance on
spending led Congress to prohibit supplemental coverage for
prescription drugs for beneﬁciaries enrolled in Part D [4].
There is a large body of evidence concerning the effect of
supplemental medical coverage on treatment and spending for
Medicare beneﬁciaries [5–11]. Early estimates suggested that bene-
ﬁciaries with Medigap plans (i.e., privately purchased supplemen-
tal insurance) spent 25% more than did beneﬁciaries with only
Medicare fee-for-service [5,6], while more recent evidence suggests
effects of smaller magnitude [7]. Estimates of the effect of supple-
mental coverage differ depending on how supplemental coverage
is measured, and whether supplemental coverage is treated as
endogenous in models of service use and spending [8,9]. Forociety for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research (ISPOR).
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controlling for endogeneity of the supplemental insurance choice
and found strong insurance effects despite evidence of favorable
selection into supplemental insurance plans without prescription
drug coverage and adverse selection into supplemental insurance
plans with prescription drug coverage. The consensus among
economists is that policies designed to reduce supplemental
coverage will serve to reduce total Medicare spending [1,5–8].
One open question is how such policies would affect selected
subgroups of Medicare beneﬁciaries, and in particular, patients
with life-threatening illness, such as cancer. Economic theory
suggests that the decision to pursue health care is a function of
individual, provider, and health care system factors, including the
out-of-pocket price of care, as reﬂected in the presence and type of
supplemental insurance. The overall demand for health care is
inelastic, with estimates ranging around 0.20 [12]. Health shocks
or serious chronic conditions may shift the demand for health care,
rendering it even more inelastic. Remler and Atherly [13] examined
cost-sharing responsiveness of Medicare beneﬁciaries with varying
levels of health status and found that those in poorer health were
signiﬁcantly less responsive to cost-sharing than were those in
better health. A 2006 study by Goldman et al. [14] found that
demand for specialty drugs used to treat cancer and other critical
conditions was highly inelastic. Although these two studies are far
from deﬁnitive, it would appear that limiting access to supplemen-
tal Medicare insurance would be ineffective in reducing expendi-
tures for beneﬁciaries in poor health and with critical illness;
rather, it would shift the ﬁnancial burden from the Medicare
program to the beneﬁciary via increased out-of-pocket spending.
We conducted this analysis to extend the knowledge base
regarding heterogeneous responses to Medicare supplemental insur-
ance and, in particular, to determine whether beneﬁciaries with a
new cancer diagnosis respond differently to the ﬁnancial incentives
embedded in supplemental policies than do beneﬁciaries without
cancer. The cost to treat a newly diagnosed cancer patient can be
substantial. In fact, per-person costs for treating cancer are higher
than the costs of treating heart disease, trauma, mental disorders,
and pulmonary conditions [15]. Cancer, a disease associated with
aging, is almost 10 times more prevalent among the elderly than
among the under-65 year population [16]. By one estimate, the
combination of an aging population plus the introduction of new
cancer treatments will cost $173 billion annually by 2020 [17].
Our primary data source was the Medicare Current Beneﬁciary
Survey (MCBS), which not only provides a rich source of informa-
tion on supplemental insurance and total health care spending but
also contains essential information on income, assets, and other
factors that may confound the effect of supplemental insurance.
We hypothesize that after controlling for these factors, beneﬁcia-
ries with cancer will be less responsive than beneﬁciaries without
cancer to the presence and type of supplemental insurance.Methods
Data Set
Data for this study come from the MCBS, a rotating panel design
surveying approximately 4,500 new beneﬁciaries each year, for
the years 1997-2007. MCBS respondents are followed for up to 4
years or until death or loss to follow-up. During that period they
are interviewed in the fall of their induction year and then three
times annually during the second through fourth survey years.
Information captured includes use and expenditures for health
services, insurance coverage, access to care, health and functional
status, socioeconomic status, and demographic characteristics.
We also used the annual spring MCBS Income & Asset supple-
ments that provide detailed self-reported information on assetsand source of income for the previous year. MCBS respondents are
asked about their use and cost of all health care services whether
covered by Medicare or not, including prescription drugs. Finally,
the MCBS provides all Part A and B claims for each beneﬁciary
including hospital inpatient, outpatient, physician, laboratory,
durable medical equipment, skilled nursing facility, home health
agency, and hospice claims.
Sample Design and Cohort Selection
We constructed nine panels from the MCBS ﬁles, the ﬁrst panel
representing respondents inducted in 1997 and tracked through
2000 and the last panel representing those inducted in 2006 but
followed through 2007.
We identiﬁed a cohort of community-dwelling beneﬁciaries
with newly diagnosed cancer by using a claims-based algorithm
described below. A noncancer cohort was identiﬁed that did not
meet criteria for a cancer diagnosis any time during the period of
MCBS participation. In both cases, sample beneﬁciaries had to be
continuously enrolled in Part A and B during the study period. We
excluded Medicare Advantage enrollees from the sample because
Medicare claims data necessary to identify a cancer diagnosis were
either missing or incomplete. We also excluded beneﬁciaries resid-
ing in a long-term care facility at any point during the 4-year panel
because prescription drug data are not collected during a long-term
care residence. Beneﬁciaries with incomplete MCBS surveys for
reasons other than death were excluded from the analysis.
Our cancer cohort was based on the presence of cancer-related
International Classiﬁcation of Diseases, Ninth Revision, Clinical Modiﬁ-
cation (ICD-9-CM) diagnosis codes (140-172, 174-208, 225, 227.3, or
227.4) in claims. An algorithm for study eligibility was used that
required beneﬁciaries to have a diagnosis of any cancer including
melanoma (but not other skin cancers) on at least one inpatient
claim, or two outpatient claims within 13 months of the ﬁrst claim
identiﬁed. To generate a subset of newly diagnosed cancer cases,
we imposed a 12-month washout period during which the
beneﬁciary did not qualify as having cancer. To avoid selecting
beneﬁciaries with “rule-out” cancer diagnoses, we did not count
any additional ICD-9-CM diagnosis codes in the 30-day period
right after the ﬁrst ICD-9-CM cancer code found. Each cancer
patient was assigned an index date according to the ﬁrst time we
observed a claim with a qualifying cancer diagnosis. We assigned
a randomly selected index date for the noncancer controls to
match the temporal distribution of index dates for beneﬁciaries
with cancer. The ﬁnal sample included 11,525 beneﬁciaries: 1,799
with newly diagnosed cancer and 9,726 without cancer.
Measures
Outcome variables
Our outcome variable was total health care spending across 2 years
comprising the index year and the subsequent year. This measure
captured total payments for all health care services received,
including inpatient and outpatient care, medical services, equip-
ment and supplies, home health visits, skilled nursing facility stays,
hospice, and prescription medications. Ideally, we would have
measured expenditures for a period beginning with the index date,
for a period of 12 months. While it would have been possible to
create such a measure by using only services reported in claims, we
sought to include spending on services not universally covered by
Medicare, including prescription drugs, which were reported only
on an annual basis. Expenditures for all nine panels were inﬂated
to constant 2007 dollars by using the Consumer Price Index.
Key explanatory measure
The key variable of interest was the presence and type of
Medicare supplemental medical and prescription drug coverage.
Table 1 – Descriptive statistics.
Characteristics Mean/% (SE)
Cancer
cohort
Noncancer
cohort
Sample size 1,799 9,726
Dependent variable
Total health care spending 41,789 (1,112.9) 17,701 (315.9)*
Policy variables
Supplemental medical and prescription drug coverage (%)
Public insurance 14 (0.9) 20 (0.6)*
ESI 42 (1.5) 40 (0.7)
Other private with Rx 8 (0.7) 10 (0.5)‡
Other private without Rx 15 (1.0) 15 (0.5)
None 20 (1.1) 14 (0.4)*
Observed control variables
Age (y) (%)
o65 6 (0.6) 16 (0.4)*
65–69 16 (1.0) 20 (0.5)*
70–74 21 (1.1) 23 (0.5)
75–79 25 (1.2) 18 (0.4)*
80–84 18 (0.9) 13 (0.3)*
85þ 13 (0.7) 10 (0.3)*
Age 65þ y and former SSDI (%) 7 (0.6) 7 (0.3)
Sex (%)
Female 48 (1.3) 56 (0.6)*
Male 52 (1.3) 44 (0.6)*
Race/ethnicity (%)
White 84 (1.1) 81 (0.8)†
Black 9 (0.8) 9 (0.6)
Hispanic 4 (0.6) 5 (0.5)†
Other 4 (0.5) 5 (0.3)†
Marital status (%)
Married 57 (1.3) 52 (0.6)*
Other 43 (1.3) 48 (0.6)*
Living situation (%)
Lives alone 30 (1.0) 31 (0.6)
Other 70 (1.0) 69 (0.6)
Education (%)
No high school 14 (0.9) 14 (0.6)
Some high school 15 (1.0) 16 (0.5)
High school graduate 29 (1.2) 30 (0.7)
Some higher education 42 (1.4) 40 (0.9)
Income as % of FPL (%)
Up to 100% 13 (1.0) 16 (0.5)†
101%–200% 27 (1.1) 30 (0.6)*
201%–300% 21 (1.0) 20 (0.5)
Over 300% 39 (1.4) 34 (0.8)*
Assets (%)
Under $2,500 17 (1.0) 23 (0.6)*
$2,500–$25,000 17 (1.0) 23 (0.6)*
$25,001–$100,000 23 (1.0) 20 (0.5)†
$100,001–$200,000 16 (0.9) 12 (0.4)*
$200,000þ 27 (1.2) 22 (0.6)*
Location (%)
Urban 72 (1.8) 70 (1.5)
Rural 28 (1.8) 30 (1.5)
Region (%)
East 21 (1.4) 19 (0.9)
Midwest 25 (1.4) 25 (1.1)
South 40 (1.8) 39 (1.5)
West 14 (1.5) 16 (1.2)†
Index year (%)
1997–1999 14 (0.9) 14 (0.7)
2000–2001 23 (1.3) 22 (1.0)
2002–2003 21 (1.1) 20 (0.4)
2004–2005 23 (1.4) 22 (0.9)
2006–2007 20 (1.3) 22 (0.9)
Months observed 18 (0.2) 19 (0.1)*
ADL/IADL limitations (%)
None 54 (1.4) 60 (0.6)*
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and from this we generated ﬁve exhaustive and mutually exclu-
sive categories of coverage, applying a hierarchy in which
beneﬁciaries had more than one type of coverage. The categories
were (in hierarchical order) as follows: 1) public insurance
(supplemental medical with or without prescription drug), 2)
employer-sponsored insurance (ESI) (supplemental medical with
or without prescription drug coverage), 3) other private medical
with prescription drug coverage, 4) other private medical without
prescription drug coverage, and 5) no supplemental insurance.
Public insurance includes full and partial Medicaid dual eligibles,
and anyone reporting that he or she has some other type of
publicly subsidized medical coverage. The source of supplemen-
tal medical and prescription drug coverage would affect the
generosity of the insurance. Employment-related plans are
known to provide the most generous coverage, and they usually
include prescription drug coverage. Medigap plans vary in gen-
erosity compared with employment-related plans. Although
Medicaid theoretically provides the most comprehensive cover-
age with minimal to no cost sharing, the program suffers from
reductions in access [18].
Although not all beneﬁciaries with ESI or other public reported
prescription drug coverage, there were inadequate numbers to
split the categories. We did differentiate, however, between other
private medical with and without prescription drug coverage
following Atherly [8] who found particularly strong selection
effects associated with this distinction.
Control variables
The MCBS provides a rich set of control variables. In our multi-
variate analysis, we controlled for beneﬁciary demographic char-
acteristics including age, race, sex, marital status, living situation,
urban residence, geographic region, education, income, and
assets. We also included health status variables such as func-
tional status (activities of daily living and instrumental activities
of daily living) [19], comorbidities via hierarchical condition
categories [20], and death (a dummy indicator whether the
beneﬁciary died during the observation period). We included a
variable to capture attitudes toward care seeking (“do you usually
go to the doctor as soon as you feel bad”). We also controlled for
the index year and the number of months a beneﬁciary was
observed during the 2-year period.
Instrumental variables
We collected county- and state-level instrumental variables (IVs)
to correct for possible endogeneity related to supplemental
insurance coverage by using data sources such as Area Resource
File, National Association of Health Underwriters, Kaiser Family
Foundation, and Medical Expenditure Panel Survey Insurance
Component. Following Atherly [8] and others [21–25], we selected
IVs for our auxiliary equation that we expected would be highly
predictive of availability and enrollment in each supplemental
coverage group. For example, state small group issue and rating
regulations have been used as indicators for ESI offer and take-up
and nongroup market regulations have been used as predictors of
coverage in the nongroup and Medigap markets [21–25]. Table 1
summarizes the descriptive statistics for the IVs used in the
multivariate model. The IVs were merged in at the county or
state levels by year for each beneﬁciary.
Multivariate Analysis
This analysis was designed to estimate the differential effect of
supplemental insurance on health care spending among newly
diagnosed cancer patients compared with beneﬁciaries without
cancer, controlling for potential confounders. Interactions
Table 1 – continued
Characteristics Mean/% (SE)
Cancer
cohort
Noncancer
cohort
1–4 38 (1.3) 34 (0.5)*
44 8 (0.7) 7 (0.3)‡
Vital status (%)
Died during year 21 (1.0) 3 (0.2)*
HCCs (%)
o2 3 (0.5) 21 (0.5)*
2–4 22 (1.0) 34 (0.6)*
5–8 45 (1.3) 34 (0.6)*
48 30 (1.3) 11 (0.4)*
Attitudes about care
seeking (%)
Usually, you go to the
doctor as soon as you
start to feel bad
33 (1.3) 33 (0.8)
Adjusted average per capita
cost
605 (5.0) 600 (4.4)
Instrumental variables
% of employment by industry§
Construction 6.91 (0.108) 6.92 (0.096)
Federal government 2.81 (0.191) 2.78 (0.176)
Other government 12.09 (0.259) 12.35 (0.264)*
State policy measures (%)
Guaranteed issue regulations in nongroup market||
None 40.61 (3.387) 41.99 (3.218)
HIPAA requirements 35.45 (3.201) 35.26 (3.060)
GI all 23.95 (2.365) 22.75 (2.150)
Rating structure in nongroup market||
None 68.30 (2.955) 69.61 (2.771)
Rate band 8.04 (2.018) 8.13 (1.907)
Modiﬁed community
rating
14.19 (1.935) 12.83 (1.727)†
Community rating 9.47 (1.701) 9.43 (1.622)
State with elimination rider
status||
65.80 (2.817) 66.99 (2.531)
Preexisting condition look-
back period (412 mo)||
51.15 (3.092) 50.50 (3.037)
State offers pharmacy
beneﬁts through the
qualiﬁed Medicare
program¶
72.08 (3.179) 70.11 (3.214)
Qualiﬁed State
Pharmaceutical
Assistance Program¶
42.05 (2.969) 41.54 (2.944)
ADL/IADL, activities of daily living/instrumental activities of daily
living; ESI, employer-sponsored insurance; FPL, federal poverty
level; GI, guaranteed issue; HCC, hierarchical condition categories;
HIPAA, Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996; Rx, prescription; SSDI, Social Security Disability Insurance.
 Difference between cancer and noncancer cohort signiﬁcant at
P o 0.01.
† Difference between cancer and noncancer cohort signiﬁcant at
P o 0.05.
‡ Difference between cancer and noncancer cohort signiﬁcant
at P o 0.10.
§ County-level variables, source 2009 Area Resource Files.
|| State-level variables, source National Association of Health
Underwriters.
¶ State-level variables, source Kaiser Family Foundation.
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tation as the reference category) generated the parameter esti-
mates of interest. We estimated a series of progressively complex
models. First, we estimated models in which supplementalmedical and prescription drug coverage was presumed to be
exogenous—referred to as the main model hereafter. Models
were estimated by using a generalized linear model with a
gamma distribution and a log link to correct for the positively
skewed distribution of health care spending. We estimated a
single model, as opposed to a two-part model, because there were
only 161 individuals with 0 spending over the 2-year observation
period. We calculated marginal (incremental) effects of cancer,
insurance type, and Cancer  Insurance interactions by using the
“margins” command in Stata 12.
The literature suggests that there is endogeneity of insurance
decisions due to unobserved confounding effects [6,8,9]. Failure to
correct for endogeneity can lead to biased coefﬁcient estimates from
the multivariate models. We estimated a model to assess the
possible bias associated with the selection of insurance type on
unobserved factors by using a two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI)
instrumental variable model. The 2SRI approach provides a consis-
tent estimator with endogeneity correction in nonlinear models [26].
2SRI is a two-stage estimation process. In the ﬁrst stage,
auxiliary regression models are estimated for each possibly
endogenous variable. The right-hand side of the regression
equation includes at least one IV for each endogenous variable
and some or all of the observed control variables from the
outcome model. The results from the ﬁrst stage are used to
generate predicted values and calculate residuals. In the second
stage, the outcome of interest is estimated including all the
observed control variables, the potentially endogenous variables,
and the predicted residuals from the auxiliary equations.
An instrumental variables approach should satisfy two con-
ditions: 1) the IVs should be strongly correlated with the endoge-
neous variable in the ﬁrst-stage auxiliary equations and 2) the
IVs should not be correlated with the error term in the out-
come equation. Stock et al. [27] state that for models with one
endogenous variable, the F-statistic higher than 10 in the
auxiliary equation indicates strong IVs. In the 2SRI model,
the signiﬁcance of the residuals indicates whether there is
evidence of endogeneity. The magnitude and sign on the resid-
uals and the coefﬁcient estimates are used to interpret any bias.
Brieﬂy, in the ﬁrst stage, insurance choice was estimated by
using a multinomial logistic regression model as a function of the
subset of same control variables as in the main model plus a set
of instruments that captured state- and/or county-level data on
industry mix, nongroup insurance market regulation, and Med-
icaid options. The selected IVs were expected to be highly
predictive of availability and enrollment in each supplemental
coverage group, and have been used in other studies as instru-
ments for supplemental insurance [8,21–25]. The second-stage
health care spending model incorporated predicted residuals
from the initial regression in addition to the potentially endo-
genous insurance variables. We evaluated the 2SRI results on the
basis of the strength of the ﬁrst-stage instruments, and the sign,
magnitude, and signiﬁcance of the estimated insurance effects
and those associated with the residuals.
All analyses were adjusted for the complex survey design of
the MCBS by using Stata 12. The University of Maryland Institu-
tional Review Board approved the study.Results
Table 1 summarizes the characteristic of the two study cohorts.
Mean 2-year health care spending was signiﬁcantly higher in the
cancer cohort ($41,789) than in the noncancer cohort ($17,701). In
general, the cancer cohort was older, disproportionately male,
white, and married, with more limitations in activities of daily
living and a higher number of chronic conditions. Death during
the study period was 21% for the cancer cohort and 3% for the
Table 3 – Marginal effect of supplemental medical
and prescription drug coverage and cancer on total
health care spending (N ¼ 11,525).
Marginal effect (SE)
Main
model
2SRI model
Supplemental medical and
prescription drug coverage
(Reference: none)
Public insurance 4,065* (966.3) 10,658† (4,938)
ESI 3,510* (800.4) 17,099* (5,595)
Other private with Rx 2,823* (1,038) 10,574 (8,148)
Other private without Rx 1,205 (887.3) 13,855‡ (7,325)
Cancer 15,605* (1,872) 15,285* (1,867)
Interaction terms
Cancer  Public Insurance 2,929† (1,292) 2,732† (1,312)
Cancer  ESI 1,997 (1,226) 1,816 (1,234)
Cancer  Other Private
with Rx
2,931† (1,297) 2,662† (1,315)
Cancer  Other Private
without Rx
203 (1,384) 41 (1,395)
Months in the study 925* (38.72) 920* (38.40)
Age (y) (Reference: 65–69 y)
o65 4,098* (956.2) 5,870* (1,129)
70–74 38 (706.7) 30 (717.4)
75–79 902 (642.4) 1,049 (694.6)
80–84 650 (655.7) 800 (716.0)
85þ 583 (681.9) 364 (764.7)
Age 65þ y and former SSDI 1,571‡ (871.7) 2,213† (924.3)
Female 2,437* (431.7) 3,063* (496.3)
Race/ethnicity (Reference: white)
Black 1,254 (1,143) 1,900‡ (1,134)
Hispanic 251 (1,057) 375 (1,218)
Other 1,448‡ (784.4) 879 (868.8)
Currently married 347 (571.5) 342 (594.8)
Lives alone 908 (600.5) 801 (612.2)
Education (Reference: no
high school)
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ces, with a higher percentage of beneﬁciaries having income
above 300% of the federal poverty level (39% vs. 34%) and a higher
percentage with assets above $200,000 (27% vs. 22%).
Table 2 presents average health care spending by type of
supplemental medical and prescription drug coverage. Within
each insurance group, beneﬁciaries with cancer had higher
spending than did those without. In addition, for both cohorts,
there were signiﬁcant differences in spending by presence of
supplemental medical and prescription drug coverage. The high-
est average health care spending was generated by beneﬁciaries
with public medical coverage, at $44,842 ( standard error [SE]
2,524) and $22,455 (SE 1,111), respectively, for beneﬁciaries with
and without cancer. The lowest average spending was generated
by beneﬁciaries with no supplemental coverage, at $37,498 (SE
1,680) and $14,221 (SE 760). Of note is that the absolute difference
between those with Medicare only compared with those with
public insurance was similar in the two cohorts, but the percent-
age difference was approximately twice as large for beneﬁciaries
without cancer. Beneﬁciaries holding other private with prescrip-
tion drug coverage had higher spending than did beneﬁciaries
with other private without prescription drug coverage, overall,
and by presence of cancer.
Table 3 shows the main and 2SRI model estimates side by side.
The results from our 2SRI analysis provided mixed evidence with
respect to endogeneity of supplemental coverage. The residuals
in the second stage on ESI and other private without drug cover-
age were signiﬁcant; however, statistical signiﬁcance for each IV
varied across equations in the ﬁrst-stage multinomial logit (see
the Appendix Table for ﬁrst-stage estimation results in
Supplemental Materials found at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jval.
2013.11.003). The joint signiﬁcance test for the IVs returned an
F-statistic value of 7.41, below the proposed threshold, and
alerting us to the potential for bias associated with weak instru-
ments [27]. And while the marginal effects for the cancer and the
interaction terms (Cancer  Supplemental Insurance Type) were
very similar in the 2SRI and main models, the marginal effects for
main supplemental insurance categories differed dramatically,
and were implausibly large for the 2SRI model. For example, the
estimated effects of ESI were $3,510 (SE 800.4) in the main modelTable 2 – Average total health care spending ($) by
the type of supplemental medical and prescription
drug coverage for overall, cancer, and noncancer
cohorts.
Supplemental medical
and prescription drug
coverage
Mean (SE)
Cancer
cohort
Noncancer
cohort
Public insurance 44,842 (2,524) 22,455 (1,111)
ESI 43,499 (1,903) 17,486 (553)
Other private with Rx 42,175 (4,278) 17,519 (811)
Other private without Rx 39,547 (2,527) 15,379 (629)
None 37,498 (1,680) 14,221 (760)
Notes: Adjusted by MCBS survey design. Among the cancer cohort,
ANOVA test result shows statistically signiﬁcant (P ¼ 0.046)
differences within supplemental drug coverage groups, similar
for noncancer cohort (P o 0.01). All difference between cancer and
noncancer cohorts signiﬁcant at P o 0.01.
ANOVA, analysis of variance; ESI, employer-sponsored insurance;
MCBS, Medicare Current Beneﬁciary Survey; Rx, prescription; SE,
standard error.
Some high school 26 (747.8) 437 (727.5)
High school graduate 420 (565.2) 1,104‡ (620.1)
Some higher education 997 (620.3) 119 (677.4)
Income as % of FPL
(Reference: up to 100%)
101%–200% 1,882* (661.3) 1,120 (889.9)
201%–300% 1,944† (924.4) 264 (1,229)
Over 300% 2,972* (799.1) 115 (1,418)
Assets (Reference: o$2,500)
$2,501–$25,000 121 (612.7) 649 (879.4)
$25,001–$100,000 735 (923.0) 99 (1,227)
$100,001–$200,000 1,153 (963.8) 805 (1,210)
$200,001þ 353 (898.4) 120 (1,188)
Urban 457 (568.7) 837 (635.8)
Region (Reference: south)
East 204 (532.2) 135 (624.2)
Midwest 176 (528.4) 677 (562.5)
West 432 (623.6) 247 (673.7)
HCC count (Reference: 0 or 1)
2–4 10,113* (936.9) 9,068* (1,121)
5–8 22,208* (1,064) 20,708* (1,301)
Z9 61,341* (3,501) 58,653* (3,990)
Activities of daily living limitations (Reference: 0 or 1)
2–3 7,149* (501.6) 7,365* (546.7)
Z4 18,761* (1,492) 20,472* (1,752)
Table 3 – continued
Marginal effect (SE)
Main
model
2SRI model
Usually go to doctor as soon
as feeling bad
2,007* (457.3) 1,115† (516.8)
Calendar year cancer ﬁrst observed (Reference: 2004–2005)
1997–1999 2,099* (808.9) 1,903† (798.7)
2000–2001 858 (794.1) 697 (787.8)
2002–2003 116 (671.7) 171 (667.1)
2006–2007 443 (625.0) 507 (943.1)
Adjusted average per capita
cost
5‡ (2.802) 5‡ (2.796)
Died during observation
period
24,435* (2,586) 24,077* (2,540)
Residuals
Residual from public
insurance equation
5,288 (3,514)
Residual from ESI equation 11,967* (4,250)
Residual from other private
with Rx equation
5,977 (5,162)
Residual from other private
without Rx equation
9,850† (4,346)
ESI, employer-sponsored insurance; FPL, federal poverty level;
HCC, hierarchical condition categories; Rx, prescription; SE, stan-
dard error; SSDI, Social Security Disability Insurance; 2SRI, two-
stage residual inclusion.
 Signiﬁcant at P o 0.01.
† Signiﬁcant at P o 0.05.
‡ Signiﬁcant at P o 0.10.
V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 7 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 1 5 – 2 120compared with $17,099 (SE 5,595) in the 2SRI model. Previous
research on the effect of presence and type of supplemental
insurance on total health care spending suggested more modest
values [2,10,11]—effect magnitudes similar to our main model
results.
In the main model, the adjusted difference in spending
between the cancer and noncancer comparison group without
supplemental insurance was $15,605 (SE 1,872). Relative to those
without medical or prescription drug coverage, beneﬁciaries with
public coverage, ESI, and other private with prescription drug
coverage had signiﬁcantly higher total spending ($4,065 [SE 966.3],
$3,510 [SE 800.4], and $2,823 [SE 1,038], respectively). The inter-
action terms between cancer and other private with prescription
drug coverage and public coverage categories were negative,
suggesting a dampening of the effect of supplemental insurance
for the cancer cohort. To assess the full effect of insurance among
the beneﬁciaries with cancer, we calculated and tested the linear
sum of each insurance main effect and its corresponding cancer
interaction term. For example, the Cancer  Public interaction
effect was $2,929 (SE 1,292). The linear sum of the main effect
($4,065) and the interaction effect was $1,136. The adjusted Wald
test provided no evidence that the linear sum was different from
zero (F-statistic ¼ 0.13; P ¼ 0.72). We did not ﬁnd any nonzero net
effects of the supplemental insurance categories for the cancer
cohort, suggesting that beneﬁciaries with cancer did not have a
signiﬁcant response to supplemental insurance.
We note that the 2SRI results in this regard were somewhat
different. In the case of public insurance, the main effect was
$10,658 (SE 4,938) and the Cancer  Public interaction effect was
$2,732 (SE 1,312). The linear sum of these effects was $7,926,
with an F-statistic of 2.66 (P ¼ 0.103). Although the effect for
public insurance did not meet signiﬁcance using an alpha valueof 0.05, we found signiﬁcant effects associated with ESI and with
other private medical without prescription coverage. Hence, the
2SRI results suggested that beneﬁciaries with cancer were less
responsive to incentives associated with supplemental insurance
relative to those without cancer, but for the two categories of
coverage, still had a nonzero response.
Associations between total spending and age, sex, education,
income, health status, attitudes about care seeking, number of
months observed, index year, and death were also found.Conclusions
This study considered whether the availability and type of
supplemental medical and prescription drug coverage might
affect health care spending by community-dwelling Medicare
beneﬁciaries. The type of supplemental coverage represents a
proxy for the different out-of-pocket prices faced by Medicare
beneﬁciaries at the point of consumption. We hypothesized that
although Medicare beneﬁciaries with supplemental coverage
would spend more in general, beneﬁciaries with newly diagnosed
cancer would be less responsive to insurance than those without
cancer. Our ﬁndings strongly support this hypothesis, in that we
found higher spending associated with supplemental insurance
among beneﬁciaries without cancer, while these effects were
substantially dampened for beneﬁciaries with cancer.
One of the complexities of analyzing demand under insurance
is the possibility that insurance choice is endogenous (i.e., that
those with the highest expected spending will choose the most
generous coverage). Several previous studies of supplemental
insurance effects among Medicare beneﬁciaries have found
evidence of endogeneity and biased estimates [6,8,9]. In this
study, we found mixed evidence for endogeneity in our 2SRI
analysis, with evidence of a downward bias in some estimates.
We found some evidence for endogeneity associated with ESI and
other private insurance without drug coverage. When we
adjusted for potential endogeneity by using a 2SRI method,
however, we did not ﬁnd differences in the estimated effects of
cancer or the Supplemental Insurance  Cancer interaction terms
—the key parameters of interest concerning heterogeneity of
response. The strength of our instruments and the known
tendency of 2SRI models to inﬂate estimates when instruments
are not particularly strong were big concerns. Given that the
essential parameter estimates related to the effects of cancer and
interactions between cancer and supplemental insurance were
very close for the two models, we conclude that Medicare
beneﬁciaries with cancer are not responsive (main) or less
responsive (2SRI model results) to incentives of supplemental
insurance compared with beneﬁciaries without cancer.
We expect that by using the MCBS we were able to control for
self-reported preferences concerning health care use, a measure
that may not be available in more limited data sets. As a result,
our study may be less subject to bias associated with unobserv-
able confounders. In the end, the results of the 2SRI analysis were
implausibly large, possibly due to bias associated with instru-
ments that were not sufﬁciently strong. Finding strong instru-
ments and justifying their use has been one of the most difﬁcult
tasks in the IV literature. It was particularly arduous for our
model in which the variable of interest, supplemental insurance,
was a categorical variable with ﬁve values.
Our study has additional limitations associated with the use
of survey data, including the potential for reporting error in
demographics, and type of private insurance. The scope of our
study focuses on comparing response to insurance for beneﬁcia-
ries with and without cancer. In this study, we did not address
whether supplemental insurance within a cohort of beneﬁciaries
with cancer has a differential effect on cancer-related as opposed
V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 7 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 1 5 – 2 1 21to other spending, whether spending is appropriate, or whether
response to insurance differs by cancer site or stage at diagnosis.
It is not clear that the MCBS would be the most appropriate data
set to address these latter questions, because the MCBS does not
provide deﬁnitive information on the cancer primary site and
offers no information concerning stage at diagnosis or histology.
Until data sets such as the Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End
Results-Medicare include information on supplemental insur-
ance, however, the MCBS remains the sole source for this type
of analysis.
In conclusion, we ﬁnd that Medicare beneﬁciaries with cancer
are less responsive to the presence and type of supplemental
insurance than are beneﬁciaries without cancer. Several recent
proposals would change the Medicare fee-for-service beneﬁt with
concurrent restrictions on access to Medicare supplemental
coverage [28]. Enactment of such policies might not affect out-
of-pocket spending by Medicare beneﬁciaries, on average. Our
results suggest that beneﬁciaries with cancer would be unlikely
to reduce their total spending substantially in response to such
restrictions, and could end up with a much greater burden in out-
of-pocket spending. It will be important for policymakers to
carefully consider the welfare effects associated with such cover-
age restrictions, particularly when viewed from the perspective of
cancer care.
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